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After the breakdown of the central planning system, Central and East European countries (CEECs) 
took considerable effort in liberalising their economies leading to lasting changes in CEEC trade. As a 
result, between 1996 and 2004 almost all of these countries displayed very high growth rates of both 
exports and imports, exceeding OECD and Russian performance. These trade developments are 
described and interpreted in this note on a descriptive rather than an analytical basis. First, trade vol-
umes by goods categories are examined to account for what kind of goods are the major trade growth 
drivers. In general, growth in exports and imports is mainly driven by goods used in production rather 
than consumer goods. Specifically for the Central and East European EU members (EU-8), export and 
import growth is mainly driven by capital goods and two-way trade in a special subgroup of intermedi-
ate goods, i.e., parts and accessories of capital goods. This result can be associated with increasing 
offshoring activities between the old EU member states and the new EU-8 countries. A closer look at 
EU-8 exports to and imports from Germany confirms this finding: EU-8 states tend to import parts and 
accessories of capital goods from Germany to produce and export parts and accessories of capital 
goods or final capital goods to Germany. Second, the effects of liberalisation on the variety versus the 
intensity of trade are described. Here as well, CEEC growth in trade at the extensive margin is driven 
by intermediate rather than consumer goods. Considering the import side this finding has important 
implications: While more consumer goods “only” have static welfare effects, a higher input variety 
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In this note, an attempt is made to describe 
and interpret trade developments of Central 
and East European countries (i.e., the EU-8 
and South-Eastern Europe, as defined in the 
notes to figure 1 below) against the back-
ground of recent advances in the literature on 
growth and international trade. The note is 
purely descriptive rather than analytical, and 
illustrates rather than tests hypothesised in-
terdependences between reform, growth, and 
trade. In particular, I illustrate these interde-
pendences by simple figures tracing trade 
developments over time, tacitly assuming re-
form effects to dominate the growth of trade. 
To go beyond the changes in aggregate trade I 
first compare growth contributions of different 
goods categories to changes in total trade, and 
explain the findings as deepening vertical spe-
cialization and offshoring across Europe. In the 
second part, I explore extensive versus inten-
sive trade margins, i.e., changes in the set or 
variety of traded goods versus changing vol-
umes of traded goods, again differentiating 
goods categories by use. I relate the empirical 
results to the literature on heterogeneous firms 
and trade and to technological change.  
According to a standard gravity approach, 
trade is influenced by the incomes of trading 
partners and by bilateral as well as multilateral 
obstacles to trade. Liberalisation can thus be 
expected to have direct and indirect – via in-
come –– effects on trade.  The impact of trade 
liberalisation resulting from policies or mutual 
agreements is usually analysed within a gravity 
framework by adding policy variables. In this 
vein, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find that a 
free trade agreement may double bilateral 
trade after ten years.  
CEEC trade liberalisation proceeded very 
quickly after the early nineties: most of these 
countries featured fully, or almost fully, liberal-
ised foreign trade and payments regimes, as 
measured by the respective index of the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, already by the mid nineties. At the same 
time, trade with the European Union, their 
evolving most important partner region, was 
liberalised by successive waves of Europe 
Agreements that came close to free trade 
agreement (Spies and Marques, 2006), culmi-
nating in full EU membership for the EU-8 in 
May 2004, and for Romania and Bulgaria by 
January 2007. Accordingly, the main difference 
influencing the trade developments of CEEC 
economies as compared to OECD – or the 
less boldly reforming former Soviet Union suc-
cessor states (Frensch and Nowak, 2003) – 
has in the recent past been the unparalleled 
liberalisation effort of the former. 
 
 
Trade volumes by goods categories and the 
rise of offshoring  
Figure 1 documents recent trade develop-
ments by regions. EU-8 shows the highest 
growth rates both in terms of exports and im-
ports, South-Eastern Europe displays the sec-
ond highest, with, however, import growth by 
far outstripping export growth. OECD econo-
mies as well as Russia show substantially 
lower trade growth (however, including fuels 
and lubricants, Russian export growth amounts 
to about 9 per cent, i.e., about twice as high a 
documented in Figure 1). 
The growth contribution of an individual 
goods category indicates that trade growth 
which would prevail assuming trade of all other 
goods categories would have stayed constant. 
Consequently, the sum of all categories’ trade 
contributions equals the growth rate of total 
trade. As figure 1 shows it is not consumer 
goods that drive trade growth in any region, 
but rather goods used in production. Particu-
larly interesting are the comparatively very 
high contributions of capital goods, and of 
parts and accessories of capital goods, a spe-
cial subset of intermediate products, to export 
and import growth rates of the EU-8 country 
group. This is a phenomenon, which may well 
be related to the current debate on offshoring. 
Industrial production is done in sequential 
stages, in each of which some value is added 
to the product. Firms regularly allocate parts of 
the production chain across different plants, or 
outsource them to other firms. Once this oc-
curs across international borders, offshoring 
implies that goods are produced in sequential 
stages in two or more countries, such that at 
least one country must use imported inputs in 
its stage of the production process, and some 
of the resulting output must be exported in 
some sort of vertical linkage. The key aspect of 
vertical linkages is thus the use of imported 
intermediate inputs in producing goods that are 
exported (Hummels et al., 2001). It is exactly 
for this purpose that I identify the special sub-
set of intermediate goods used as inputs for 
capital goods, i.e. parts and accessories of 
capital goods: all countries in the sample are 
vertically linked in the sense that all of them 
both export and import parts and accessories 
of capital goods, while at the same time ex-Decomposing a decade’s growth of Central and Eastern Europe’s trade  
porting the final product, i.e., capital goods: 
accordingly, two-way trade in intermediate 
products  may  – while two-way trade in parts 





















Figure 1:   Average annual real rates of change of exports and imports, 1996–2004. 
 
Notes: Data include all goods except fuels and lubricants; for more data background, see the appendix to Frensch 
and Gaucaite Wittich (2009). “Parts and accessories” are a subset of all intermediate goods. “Intermediate goods” 
in this and subsequent figures are therefore all intermediate goods other than parts and accessories. Regional 
rates of change represent the median for all countries in the region. Using the mean instead would not have quali-
tatively changed the results. Regions are defined as follows: OECD comprises the pre-1994 OECD countries in 
the database, i.e., Austria , Belgium and Luxembourg (treated as one country throughout), Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States; EU-8 is the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania,. Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia; SE Europe covers Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Mace-
donia, and Yugoslavia. Russia, of course, is just Russia. 
 
First of all, the existence of offshoring mag-
nifies the trade effects of liberalisation. Yi 
(2003) shows that with symmetrically declining 
variable trade costs, the presence of vertical 
linkages has a magnifying effect on trade in a 
multilateral setting, which helps to account for 
the enormous growth in world trade over the 
past decades. Frensch (2009) identifies a uni-
lateral complement to this trade magnifying 
effect by uncovering a substantially stronger 
than average impact of full institutional trade 
liberalisation – as measured by the EBRD - on 
imports of parts and accessories of capital 
goods. 
Second, the fragmentation of the produc-
tion process involves refining the allocation of 
production from the level of goods to the level 
of stages of production, or “tasks,” where as-
sembling parts or components to a final prod-
uct is the final task not necessarily conceptu-
ally different from any other task. All this, how-
ever, involves costs of coordinating production 
over different stages at potentially different 
places in form of investment, communication, 
transport, or coordination costs, or “service link 
costs.” Firms will offshore tasks if cost reduc-
tions outweigh service link costs.  
The implications – including the distribu-
tional effects – of this new paradigm of trading 
tasks rather than final products are discussed 
in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). 
Assuming that firms are able to use their own 
technology whenever they opt to offshore parts 
of production, Grossmann and Rossi-
Hansberg demonstrate that costs of offshoring 
versus wage differences drive the international 
division of the production chain. Offshoring 
may be attractive, if some factors can be hired 
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more cheaply abroad than at home, but it also 
is costly, because remote performance of a 
task limits the opportunities for monitoring and 
coordinating workers.  
Bridging the mostly semantic gap between 
“tasks” and “production in sequential stages,” 
when the costs of offshoring fall substantially 
the result should be an increasingly intense 
two-way trade in vertically linked products be-
tween countries with different wage levels. The 
most noticeable incidents of offshoring have so 
far been registered in East Asian trade (Kimura 
et al., 2007), as a consequence of fragmenta-
tion in Japanese production of machinery. But 
all the described features seem also particu-
larly relevant for East-West trade in Europe. 
The CEEC is a group of emerging industrial-
ised economies, but still with comparatively 
low wages. Transition caused a substantial 
decline in transaction costs in East-West trade, 
at a time that coincided with a wave of offshor-
ing in Western Europe. Accordingly, Frensch 
(2009) finds evidence that intra-EU25 trade in 
parts and components increasingly signals the 






























Figure 2:   Average annual real rates of change of exports to Germany, 1996–2004.  
  Split into growth contributions of different goods categories 
Note: Negative bars have to be subtracted from positive bars to obtain total growth rates. 
 
 
Accordingly, the very high contributions of 
parts and accessories of capital goods to the 
export and import growth rates of the EU-8 
country group are an indication offshoring ac-
tivities with old EU members. This picture is 
sharpened in Figure 2, which allows a closer 
look at export growth by exporter and goods 
category specifically to the German market. 
The main contribution to export growth to Ger-
many from the majority of EU-8 countries in-
deed comes from parts and accessories of 
capital goods (including transport equipment), 
i.e., from involvement in offshoring activities of 
firms especially in the Czech Republic, Esto-
Kurzanalysen  
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nia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Also of 
interest in this respect is of course the devel-
opment of Chinese – and to some extent also 
South Korean – exports to Germany over the 
same time: with 19 per cent, China’s average 
annual real rate of export growth to Germany 
is the highest in our sample of countries be-
tween 1996 and 2004. While the contribution 
of parts and accessories is also important, the 
main driver of Chinese export growth to Ger-
many is final capital goods, mostly as a result 
of assembly tasks offshored to China:  China’s 
involvement in offshoring has been deliberately 
encouraged by a selective trade policy grant-
ing preferential tariff treatment to assembly 
(Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci, 2004). 
Growth rates of imports from Germany tend 
even to be higher than for exports, with con-
siderable contributions from capital goods (see 
below). Figure 3 generally confirms the picture 
of a substantial two-way trade of the majority 
of EU-8 countries with Germany in parts and 
accessories, reflecting German firms’ offshor-
ing production tasks to these countries.  
 
 
















Figure 3:   Average annual real rates of change of EU-8 imports from Germany.  
  Split into growth distribution of different goods categories, 1996-2004 
Note: No data available for East Asian countries. 
  
The effect of liberalisation: variety versus 
intensity of trade  
It is only quite recently that trade margins, i.e., 
trade variety versus intensity, have been stud-
ied empirically. From Hummels and Klenow 
(2005) we know that larger economies trade 
more than smaller economies, and that this 
holds for both margins of trade. I.e., larger 
economies trade both a larger basket of goods 
(i.e., they trade more along the extensive mar-
gin) and higher volumes per good (i.e., along 
the intensive margin). Liberalization can affect 
both margins: the establishment of NAFTA had 
an impetus on respective countries’ extensive 
margins of trade (Hillberry and McDaniel, 
2002), and U.S. tariff liberalisation was found 
by Feenstra and Kee (2007) to increase the 
export variety from Mexico and China.  
When differentiating goods by country of 
origin or destination, trade growth accordingly 
occurs when countries trade more of the same 
goods with old partners (deepening trade in-
tensity along the intensive margin), or begin 
trading new goods and/or with new partners 
(widening trade variety along the extensive 
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margin). In Figure 4, the same trade growth 
rates already shown in Figure 1 are decom-
posed along the contributions of the extensive 
versus  intensive margin: clearly, more trade 
growth usually also means more growth along 
both margins, with Russia once more being the 
exception from the rule: Russian export and 
import growth is higher than that of the OECD. 
However, Russia does not display a higher 
growth rate along the extensive margin, which 
would point to higher diversification of imports 
and/or exports; in fact, the variety of imports 
even shrinks. 
As already argued above, the main feature 
distinguishing the experience of OECD versus 
CEEC economies has in the recent past been 
the unparalleled reform effort of the latter. Both 
the own trade liberalisation as well as the one 
with the evolving major trading partner, the 
European Union, have had an enormous impe-
tus on these countries’ extensive and intensive 
margins of trade. For trade volumes, this ef-
fects has already been documented in Figure 
1; according to Figure 4, there is, however, no 
systematic variation between country groups in 
trade growth contributions of the extensive 
margin, which lingers between 35 and 40 per 
cent (except for Russia), irrespective of the 
liberalisation effort. This may be due to the fact 
that liberalisation “on average” works both 
along the extensive and the intensive margins 
of trade.  
.  














Figure 4:   Average annual real rates of change of exports and imports, 1996–2004.  
  Split into variety and intensity contribution 
Note: Variety is defined as the number of goods differentiated by country of origin or destination. For this purpose, 
55 individual countries are selected that generally account for 80–95 per cent of reported trade. Accordingly, in-
tensity is real trade volume divided by variety. 
 
Studying extensive versus  intensive trade 
margins presupposes a theoretical model with 
product differentiation. Preserving the gravity 
structure of trade, recent theories (Melitz, 
2003; Chaney, 2008) generalise Krugman’s 
(1980) approach by combining firm heteroge-
neity in productivity with the introduction of 
fixed costs of exports, allowing to differentiate 
among exporting and non-exporting firms in 
terms of the profitability of incurring fixed ex-
port costs. As a first consequence, the exis-
tence of fixed costs of entering a market may 
Kurzanalysen  
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explain the positive relationship between a 
country’s export or import variety and total 
income noted in Hummels and Klenow (2002 
and 2005): as country sizes increase, firms of 
lower productivity find it profitable to incur fixed 
export costs. Second, particularly in Chaney 
(2008) a higher elasticity of substitution be-
tween products lowers the effect of trade costs 
on the extensive margin of trade  





















Figure 5: Average annual rates of change of import variety (relative to consumer goods),  
 1996-2004.  




1 Accordingly, this predicts that extensive 
import margin effects of a country’s trade liber-
alization should – via lowering costs for rest of 
the world exporters – increase with decreasing 
substitutability among products. 
Against this background, Frensch (2008) 
explores the impact of CEECs’ recent institu-
tional trade liberalisation on extensive versus 
intensive import margins. Differentiating goods 
categories by use enables to identify goods 
categories according to substitutability, as 
goods used in production are more comple-
                                                       
1
 As – variable or fixed – barriers decrease, low productiv-
ity firms enter. When product differentiation is high, i.e., 
when the elasticity of substitution is low, less productive 
firms charging higher prices still capture relatively large 
market shares with a high impact on trade flows. 
mentary than consumer goods. Frensch 
(2008) indeed finds robust evidence of 
stronger extensive import margin effects of 
liberalization for low substitutability intermedi-
ate and capital goods compared to high substi-
tutability consumer goods. Apart from thus 
supporting new models of heterogeneous firms 
and trade, this identifies an important channel 
for the link between reforms and growth in 
transition: more consumer goods variety en-
tails welcome static welfare effects (Krugman, 
1980); more input variety, however, may 
change the economy’s state of technology 
since the state of technology is related to the 
variety of capital goods available for production 
(as proposed in Romer, 1990, and success-
fully tested in Frensch 





















Parts & Accessories of Capital
Goods
Capital goods
Figure 6:   Average annual rates of change of export variety (relative to consumer goods),  
 1996-2004.  
 
and Gaucaite Wittich, 2009) with consequent 
growth effects.
2 Thus, identifying substantial 
effects of European emerging economies’ re-
cent trade liberalisation on the extensive im-
port margin of capital goods amounts to identi-
fying an important channel for the well docu-
mented but usually superficially modeled link 
between reforms and growth in transition.  
The dominance of trade liberalization upon 
extensive import margin developments of vari-
ous goods categories over the past decade is 
illustrated in figure 5: with only very few excep-
tions, growth along the extensive margin of 
goods used in production has indeed been 
higher than that for consumer goods in 
CEECs’ imports between 1996 and 2004.   
                                                       
2
 Frensch and Gaucaite Wittich (2009) suggest that a 
trade-based measure of variety of available capital goods 
allowing for product differentiation by country of origin 
behaves as if it represented technology, and that there is 
conditional technological convergence among OECD 
economies and CEECs. Adopting new technology from 
abroad then involves capital goods imports along the 
extensive margin. 
Of course, one may also want to study lib-
eralization effects on extensive export margin 
growth of various goods categories: given the 
geographical concentration of CEEC trade with 
the EU, CEEC exports are mainly exports to 
the EU, and thus constitute EU imports. Trade 
liberalization (both of CEECs as well of the EU 
vis-à-vis the CEECs) accordingly also touches 
on EU imports and should result in a similar 
pattern of varied extensive margin effects iden-
tifiable by goods categories. The illustration in 
figure 6 by and large confirms this expectation, 
especially when bearing in mind that EU liber-
alisation towards Russia and Ukraine was not 
at all on the same level as with the rest of the 
CEECs.  
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